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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Hasan lcanovic appeals from the district court's order denying his petition for
post-conviction relief following a remand from this Court.

He asserts that the district

court erred both in its determination that counsel did not provide deficient performance
and that, even if he did, Mr. lcanovic suffered no prejudice.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Hasan lcanovic filed a timely petition seeking post-conviction relief from his guilty
plea and sentencing for felony domestic violence.

(R., pp.3-4.)

In this petition,

Mr. lcanovic alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to
his counsel's failure to advise him, prior to pleading guilty, that his plea would result in
adverse immigration consequences that included deportation and loss of the ability to
seek United States citizenship. (R., p.4.) He further alleged that his resulting plea was
not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily as a result of his counsel's deficient
performance. (R., p.4.)
In his affidavit filed in support of this petition, Mr. lcanovic averred that, prior to
the entry of his plea, he had asked his counsel specifically whether this plea would
result in him being deported back to Bosnia and whether the conviction would preclude
him from becoming a United States citizen. (R., pp.7-8.) According to Mr. lcanovic, his
counsel said that neither consequence would result from his guilty plea to felony
domestic violence. (R., pp.7-8.) However, Mr. lcanovic averred that he was served with
an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer once he was placed on

1

probation

was currently being held on that detainer.

(R., pp.7-8.)

Finally,

Mr. lcanovic averred that he would not have pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence
had it not been for his counsel's erroneous advice. (R., pp.7-8.)
Thereafter, the district court issued a notice of its intent to summarily dismiss this
petition. (R., pp.15-21.) The court recognized that, accepting Mr. lcanovic's allegations
as true, his trial counsel tendered constitutionally deficient performance in light of the
recent U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky1 . (R., pp.18-19.) However,
the district court found that Mr. lcanovic had not established the prejudice prong of his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
would not have pleaded guilty

i.e. that, but for this erroneous advice, he

because the trial court advised him at the time of taking

his plea that the plea might result in adverse immigration consequences. (R., pp.1920.) Therefore, in the district court's view, the deficiency of trial counsel was remedied
by the court. (R., p.20.)
Mr. lcanovic responded to the district court's notice of its intent to dismiss his
post-conviction petition. (R., pp.27-33.) First, Mr. lcanovic noted that the immigration
consequences resulting from his plea to felony domestic battery were clear - it is an
aggravated felony, as well as a crime of domestic violence, that constitutes a deportable
offense. (R., pp.29-31.) As such, under Padilla, his counsel had a duty not just to warn
that there could be some form of adverse immigration consequences flowing from his
plea; rather, his counsel had a duty to inform Mr. lcanovic what those specific
consequences were. (R., pp.31-32.) In light of the duty to inform Mr. lcanovic regarding
the specific immigration consequences of his plea, Mr. lcanovic argued that the district

1

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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court's advisory that there may be some form of adverse consequence did not cure
counsel's deficiency. (R., p.32.)
A hearing was held on Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief.

His

former trial counsel, Jared Martens, testified at this hearing. (Tr., p.7, L.8 - p.23, L.5.)2
Mr. Martens testified that he was aware that Mr. lcanovic was Bosnian at the time of his
representation. (Tr., p.9, Ls.13-15.) He was also provided documentation during the
discovery process, prior to Mr. lcanovic's guilty plea, that indicated that Mr. lcanovic
was not a United States citizen. (Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.12, L.6.) Although Mr. Martens did
not recall whether he paid attention to this fact during the course of representing
Mr. lcanovic, he did acknowledge receiving and reviewing this documentation.
(Tr., p.11, L.24

p.12, L.8.)

Mr. Martens further acknowledged that Mr. lcanovic was concerned about the
potential immigration consequences that could arise from his criminal charges

so

much so that they had talked about the matter more than once in discussing his criminal
case.

(Tr., p.12, Ls.9-14, p.15, L.24 - p.16, L.5.)

Specifically, Mr. lcanovic was

concerned that a guilty plea would result in the institution of removal proceedings
against him. (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-24.) Mr. Martens merely told Mr. lcanovic that he didn't
knowwhetherthatwould happen. (Tr., p.12, L.25-p.13, L.17.) However, Mr. Martens
denied telling Mr. lcanovic that he specifically would not be deported based upon his
plea to felony domestic battery. (Tr., p.14, Ls.12-19.)

2

Citations to trial counsel's testimony are to the transcript filed in this Court prior to
remand. Citations to the June 21, 2013 evidentiary hearing held after remand are to
(6/21/13 Tr., p., Ls .. )
3

Mr. Martens also admitted that he could not recall specifically whether he
Mr. lcanovic that he would still be able to apply for U.S. citizenship even after his guilty
plea, although he believed that he did not make that representation. (Tr., p.14, L.23 p.15, L.10.)

In any case, Mr. Martens stated that he would have likely just referred

Mr. lcanovic to an immigration attorney to answer that question, since he was not
familiar with immigration law. (Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15 L.10.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Martens expressed his belief that the odds of a noncitizen defendant facing deportation or removal proceedings based upon a guilty plea to
felony domestic violence were not likely, but that it was, "probably a fifty-fifty shot," that
this would occur. (Tr., p.20, L.20 - p.21, L.2.) Mr. Martens did believe that, at the time
of the evidentiary hearing, such a result would be "highly probable." (Tr., p.21, L.17 p.22, L.1.) He did not share his personal assessment of the likelihood of this outcome
with Mr. lcanovic as part of his representation during the underlying criminal
proceedings; instead, Mr. Martens testified that he probably told Mr. lcanovic that he did
not know what the immigration consequences would be.

(Tr., p.21, Ls.3-13.)

Mr. Martens was also unfamiliar with the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla at the
time of his testimony. (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-16.)
During closing arguments, Mr. lcanovic pointed out to the district court that
where, as in his case, the immigration consequences for a guilty plea are clear, it is not
sufficient for counsel to merely tell a client that he or she does not know what the
immigration consequences will be.

(Tr., p.24, Ls.1-10.)

Rather, counsel must

specifically inform a non-citizen client what the consequences are and consult with the
client with these consequences in mind during any plea negotiations. (Tr., p.25, L.14.)
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Mr. lcanovic noted that, even if the district court found Mr. Martens more credible on the
of whether affirmative misadvice as to immigration consequences was given, this
did not matter for Padilla purposes, as affirmative and correct advice was required.
(Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.16.) Mr. lcanovic also disputed that the plea colloquy from the
court cured this error, as the court merely informed Mr. lcanovic that he might face
adverse immigration consequences from his plea - not that he would face adverse
immigration consequences - nor did the court inform Mr. lcanovic what those adverse
consequences would be. (Tr., p.26, L.21 - p.27, L.15.)
The district court ruled from the bench following closing arguments from the
parties. First, the court found it "difficult" to believe that Mr. lcanovic was unaware of the
immigration consequences of his plea when a judgment that was entered
plea contained an advisory that he faced an immigration hold. (Tr., p.31, L.14

his
p.32,

L.10.) The court also noted that, at the time of the taking of his guilty plea, the district
court informed Mr. lcanovic that his plea might result in adverse immigration
consequences. (Tr., p.33, Ls.19-25.)
Turning to the standards articulated in Padilla, the district court first found that
Mr. Martens did not affirmatively tell Mr. lcanovic that there would be no adverse
immigration consequences for his plea - i.e. that counsel did not provide misadvice to
Mr. lcanovic.

(Tr., p.35, Ls.16-18.)

Regarding the failure of Mr. Martens to provide

specific, accurate advice as to the immigration consequences of his plea, the district
court held that this failure was "cured" by the district court's advisory to Mr. lcanovic
during the change of plea hearing that there might be adverse immigration
consequences for his plea. (Tr., p.35, L.19 - p.37, L.21.)

5

Following the hearing on Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction petition, the district court
entered its order dismissing his petition based on the reasons set forth at that hearing.
(R., p.48.) Mr. lcanovic appealed from the district court's order dismissing his petition
for post-conviction relief.

(R., p.44.)

He asserted that he had demonstrated both

deficient performance and prejudice and that the district court erred by denying his
petition. (See generally, Appellant's Brief.) The State responded, asserting that Padilla
did not apply to Mr. lcanovic's case. (See generally, Respondent's Brief.)
At oral argument, the State conceded error and the parties entered into an
agreement to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. (See Uncontested Motion for
Remand and Statement in Support Thereof, filed on December 7, 2012 (hereinafter,
Motion for Remand.))

The State acknowledged that its position regarding the

application of Padilla was in error. (Motion for Remand, p.2.)
In the motion for remand, the State conceded that "the district court's summary
dismissal on the basis that instructing lcanovic of potential immigration consequences
cured any prejudice that might arise from incorrect immigration advice of counsel was
error." (Motion for Remand, p.2) The State conceded that, "there is an issue of fact on
the prejudice prong of his claim." (Motion for Remand, p.2) Then, the State conceded
that, "federal immigration law applicable to lcanovic provides that he is deportable."
(Motion for Remand, p.2 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)).

Finally, the State

conceded that, "there was still a disparity between correct legal advice (that deportation
was generally mandatory) and the advice given to lcanovic (that there were potential
immigration problems.)" (Motion for Remand, p.2.)

6

On remand, the parties briefed the issue and the district court subsequently held
a hearing. At the hearing, Mr. lcanovic testified that he was currently on parole and that
he was subject to an immigration hold. (6/21/13 Tr., p.49, s.11 - p.51, L.5.) He had
been informed that federal authorities were actively seeking his deportation. (6/21/13
Tr., p.52, Ls.17-19.) Mr. lcanovic testified that the only reason he had not yet been
deported was that there was confusion regarding his place of birth and neither Croatia
nor Bosnia was prepared to accept him. (6/21/13 Tr., p.53, Ls.3-14.)
Brandon Jones, a supervisory detention deportation officer for Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) testified for the State. (6/21/13 Tr., p.60, Ls.6-10.) Officer
Jones testified generally to immigration and deportation procedures and stated the
following, which is of importance in this case:
Q.
(The Prosecutor): So if an individual alien were to get the advice
that a conviction of an aggravated felony might or might not cause them
to be deported, would that be accurate advice?

A.

(Mr. Jones): Can you repeat that?

Q.
If a person as an alien was given advice that a conviction for an
aggravated felony might or might not result in their actual deportation,
would that be accurate advice?

A.

That would be accurate, yes, ma'am.

(6/21/13 Tr., p.97, Ls.10-20.)
The district court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
court found Mr. Martens more credible than Mr. lcanovic: "specifically, this Court finds
that Mr. Martens did in fact advise Mr. lcanovic that if he chose to plead guilty, it was
possible he could be deported and that there could be adverse impacts on his ability to
obtain United States citizenship." (Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.27.) Then, despite
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the

concession in this Court that the district court's warnings were inadequate,

the district court found that, "this Court advised Mr. lcanovic that a felony or even a
misdemeanor conviction could result in his deportation, inability to obtain legal status or
denial of an application for United States citizenship." (Order re: evidentiary hearing,
p.27.)
The court then found that the testimony of Officer Jones supported its conclusion
that the advice given by Mr. Martens and the district court was accurate because of the
above-referenced exchange:
Q.
(The Prosecutor): So if an individual alien were to get the advice
that a conviction of an aggravated felony might or might not cause them
to be deported, would that be accurate advice?
A.

(Mr. Jones): Can you repeat that?

Q.
If a person as an alien was given advice that a conviction for an
aggravated felony might or might not result in their actual deportation,
would that be accurate advice?
A.

That would be accurate, yes, ma'am.

(Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.28.) Thus, the court concluded that, "Mr. lcanovic was
fully aware at the time he entered his plea of the possible deportation and citizenship
consequences of his plea." (Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.28 (emphasis added.))
The district court then addressed the prejudice prong of the analysis.

First, it

noted that Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to a lesser charge than that with which he was
initially charged, and stated that, in light of the admissions Mr. lcanovic made at the
entry of plea hearing, a conviction would be a "near certainty."
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Then, the district court stated, "it is not even necessary to rely on such evidence"
because the evidence of Mr. lcanovic's guilt was overwhelming. The court summarized
this "evidence" as follows:
This was not a "he said, she said" case of domestic violence. Not only did
the victim describe the basic facts of the crime to the police and provide a
written statement, but an uninvolved third-party witness, Ms. Lynn Majors,
told officers she had witnessed Mr. lcanovic hit the victim (Sanela
Medmedovic) on the face and neck, that she yelled at Mr. lcanovic to stop,
and that she called the police, at which point Mr. lcanovic left the scene.
There was also bruising and swelling on the victim's neck observed by the
police' thus, physical evidence existed to confirm the attack and, in
addition, the petitioner himself admitted to the attack.
(Order re: evidentiary hearing, pp.31-32.)

This "evidence," as acknowledged by the

district court, comes from the State's district court brief, which the court determined, "to
be accurate statements as to the pertinent to the facts cited." (Order re: evidentiary
hearing, p.32 n.5.) The court, therefore, determined that it was not required to accept
Mr. lcanovic's assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's
misadvice because the evidence was so overwhelming, it was not reasonable to
conclude that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial.

(Order re: evidentiary

hearing, p.33.)
This Court reactivated the appeal following the district court's order. Because the
district court is incorrect with regard to both deficient performance and prejudice prongs,
Mr. lcanovic again asserts that he district court erred by denying his petition for postconviction relief.

9

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. lcanovic's Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it dismissed Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-

conviction relief because Mr. lcanovic demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to the entry of his guilty
plea to felony domestic violence. There is no dispute that Mr. lcanovic, a non-citizen,
was not informed by his trial counsel prior to entering his plea that his plea would render
him automatically and presumptively deportable under clear immigration law. Because
the immigration consequences of his plea were clear under federal law, Mr. lcanovic
was entitled to affirmative and correct advice as to the immigration consequences of this
plea. Further, because the district court's prejudice analysis is based upon evidence
that would either be inadmissible at trial or was not introduced at the evidentiary
hearing, the district court erred by holding that Mr. lcanovic suffered no prejudice.

B.

Standard Of Review
A petition seeking post-conviction relief initiates a separate civil proceeding

distinct from the original criminal actions. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,
233 (Ct. App. 1994 ). "In a post-conviction proceeding, the burden is on the applicant to
establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when
an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
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695, 700 (1999); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App.1990). When reviewing
mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court defers to the district court's factual
findings supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of the
relevant law to those facts. Id. (citing Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54 (Ct. App.1988)).
"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the
post-conviction procedure act." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002).
A petitioner's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel within a post-conviction
petition is measured by the standards articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington 3 . See, e.g., State v. Yokovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2007).
The standard involves a two-party inquiry:

first, whether the defendant has

demonstrated that his counsel tendered deficient performance, meaning that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and second, whether
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Id.

In the context of alleged deficiencies of

counsel relating to guilty pleas, the specific standard for prejudice is whether, "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2009).

3

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
12

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. lcanovic's Petition For PostConviction Relief

1.

Under Padilla v. Kentucky, Defense Counsel Owes A Duty, Pursuant To
The Sixth Amendment Of The United States Constitution, To A NonCitizen Defendant To Inform His Or Her Client Regarding Potential
Deportation Consequences Of A Guilty Plea

Prior to the recent U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky 559 U.S.
356 (2010), there was a dearth of case law in Idaho dealing with what obligations, if
any, defense counsel had towards a non-citizen client with regard to immigration
consequences flowing from a guilty plea to a criminal offense. The leading case was
Retamoza v. State, in which the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that there was no

deficient performance where defense counsel failed to advise a non-citizen criminal
defendant of the then-existing option of a judicial recommendation against deportation
(JRAD). Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 795-797 (Ct. App. 1994). The Retamoza
Court so held based explicitly on parsing out the distinction between direct and
collateral consequences of a guilty plea, and the concomitant conclusion that
immigration consequences were collateral to such a plea. Id.
The Retamoza Court's conclusion is somewhat understandable given the state of
the immigration law at the time of the defendant's plea in that case. At the time of the
guilty plea of the defendant in Retamoza in 1988, there existed two very important
mechanisms through which adverse immigration consequences flowing from a criminal
conviction could be avoided. See Retamoza, 125 Idaho at 793. First, a non-citizen who
was eligible for deportation because of a criminal conviction could seek a judicial
recommendation against deportation, or JRAD. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
362 (2010).

Under this provision, the sentencing judge for either a state or federal

13

prosecution had the

to enter a recommendation against deportation, and this

recommendation had the effect of precluding the executive branch from seeking
deportation. Id. Therefore, at the time of the Retamoza Opinion, there was no such
thing as an "automatically deportable offense."
There was an additional second layer of process through which a non-citizen
criminal

defendant could

avoid

adverse

immigration

consequences,

such

as

deportation, as a result of his or her plea at the time Retamoza was decided. Prior to
1996, the Attorney General retained discretion to grant relief from deportation. Id. at
363-64.

As such, the Retamoza Opinion dealt with an attorney's advisories about

immigration consequences to a guilty plea at a time when these consequences were
truly avoidable in virtually all cases.
But the landscape of immigration law changed drastically in the intervening
years, and these changes motivated the Padilla Court to make clear what a criminal
defense attorney's obligations are with regard to advising non-citizen clients as to
immigration consequences of a plea.

Since the time of the guilty plea at issue in

Retamoza, the authority of a trial court to grant a JRAD has been eliminated entirely; as

has the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief against deportation. Id.
As noted by the Padilla Court:
The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over
the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable
offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent
deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of
deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the
harsh consequence of deportation. The "drastic measure" of deportation
or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens
convicted of crimes.
Id. at 360 (internal citations omitted). The Court continued:

14

These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes
of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.
These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law,
indeed, sometimes the most important
deportation is an integral part
part - of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who
plead guilty to specified crimes.
Id. at 364.
In light of the modern interconnectedness between criminal guilty pleas and
presumptively mandatory adverse immigration consequences, the Padilla Court
developed a two-tiered test for what advisories are required under the Sixth Amendment
with regard to the potential immigration consequences of a plea. Where the immigration
consequences of a particular plea are "unclear or uncertain," trial counsel has a duty to
inform a non-citizen defendant that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of
adverse immigration consequences.

Id. at 368-69.

But when the deportation

consequences of a particular plea are clear, trial counsel has a duty to give his or her
non-citizen client affirmative and correct advice regarding the specific immigration
consequences of that plea. Id.
The Padilla Court, in formulating this test, explicitly rejected the idea that the
measure of counsel's responsibility in informing clients regarding the consequence of a
guilty plea is measured by whether the consequence would be classified as direct or
collateral. The Court noted that it has, "never applied a distinction between direct and
collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional
assistance' under Strickland." Id. at 365. And the Court further asserted that such a
distinction is particularly inapplicable in the context of immigration consequences for
criminal convictions. Id. at 366.

15

2.

Trial Counsel Tendered Deficient Performance When Trial Counsel Failed
To Advise Mr. lcanovic As To The Specific Potential Immigration
Consequences Of His Plea To Felony Domestic Battery

a.

The Deportation Consequences For Mr. lcanovic's Guilty Plea To
Felony Domestic Battery Were Clear Under The Federal Law

Preliminarily, prior to remand there appears to have been some confusion on the
part of the State as to what the Padilla Court meant when it discussed those cases
where the immigration consequences of a plea were clear under the federal law. The
State repeatedly referenced, and argued, the issue of whether and when Mr. lcanovic
would eventually be actually, physically removed as though this were the standard by
which counsel's duty was measured. (Tr., p.13, L.5 - p.1
p.28, L.13

L.10, p.22, L.9

p.23, L.2,

p.29, L.20.) The State's misunderstanding of the actual standard for when

definitive advice as to the potential immigration consequences of a plea is required, can
be encapsulated in the following statement:
And I think that's because immigration law is not clear. It is not a black
and white matter where you know for sure that if someone is going to be
convicted of a crime like this that they are going to be deported. Rather,
they are going to be subject to it and they may or may not be
deported which is the category that Mr. lcanovic falls into.
(Tr., p.29, Ls. 13-20) (emphasis added.)
To be clear, this is not the standard by which counsel's duty to give concrete,
accurate, affirmative advice as to the specific immigration consequences is judged. The
test is whether the federal statutory law makes it clear that the particular offense will
render a non-citizen client eligible for deportation or subject to automatic
deportation - not whether, in the best guess of defense counsel, immigration and
customs enforcement will ever get around to initiating removal proceedings.

See

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360-61; 368-69. And this standard is measured by whether, under

16

the pertinent immigration statutes, regulations, and case law, the consequence of the
defendant's guilty plea on his or her immigration status is clearly defined. Id. at 369
(finding that, "The consequences of Padilla's plea
the removal statute").
The State acknowledged this in the Motion for Remand.

(See Motion for

Remand, p.2.) Specifically, the State conceded that, "federal immigration law applicable
to lcanovic provides that he is deportable." (Motion for Remand, p.2 (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(E)(i)). Then, the State conceded that, "there was still a disparity between
correct legal advice (that deportation was generally mandatory) and the advice given to
lcanovic (that there were potential immigration problems.)" (Motion for Remand, p.2.)
Unfortunately, despite the guidance provided by the Motion for Remand, the
prosecutor and the district court engaged in the same mistake as before.

The court

stated: "specifically, this Court finds that Mr. Martens did in fact advise Mr. lcanovic that
if he chose to plead guilty, it was possible he could be deported and that there could be
adverse impacts on his ability to obtain United States citizenship."

(Order re:

evidentiary hearing, p.27.) Then, despite the State's concession in this Court that the
district court's warnings were inadequate, the district court found that, "this Court
advised Mr. lcanovic that a felony or even a misdemeanor conviction could result in his
deportation, inability to obtain legal status or denial of an application for United States
citizenship." (Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.27.)
The court concluded that, "Mr. lcanovic was fully aware at the time he entered his
plea of the possible deportation and citizenship consequences of his plea." (Order re:
evidentiary hearing, p.28.) Then, again despite the State's concession that the district
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court's warnings to Mr. lcanovic were inadequate, the district court questioned
Mr. lcanovic's intentions with regard to this petition, faulting him for advancing the
"legally baseless argument" that trial courts cannot rectify defense counsel's failure to
provide inadequate advice. (Order re: evidentiary hearing, p.28.) This is simply not the
correct standard.
As is set forth below, under the applicable immigration statutes and regulations,
the immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea were entirely clear.

His plea to

felony domestic battery rendered him subject to automatic deportation in light of two
provisions - both as an aggravated felony, as this was a "crime of violence" under
federal law, and as a crime of domestic violence.

i.

Mr. lcanovic's Guilty Plea To Felony Domestic Violence In
This Case Constituted An Admission To An Aggravated
Felony Under Immigration Law Because His Offense
Qualified As A Crime Of Violence

Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence under I.C. §§ 18-903, 18918(2).

The Amended Information as to this charge alleged that the crime was

committed as follows:
That the Defendant, HASAN ICANOVIC, on or about the 11 th day of May,
2009, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully use
force and/or violence upon the person of Sanela Mehmedovic by pushing
Sanela Mehmedovic to the ground and by committing said battery, did
inflict a traumatic injury to the person of Sanela Mehmedovic, to-wit: a
bruised lip, and where Sanela Mehmedovic and the Defendant are
household members.
(R., p.29.)
In Idaho, the offense of felony domestic violence, as charged in this case, is
defined as a battery against a household member that inflicts traumatic injury.
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See

I.

§ 18-918(2). Under the manner in which Mr. lcanovic was charged in this case, he

was alleged to have committed this battery through, "willfully and unlawfully [using] force
or violence."

I.C. § 18-903(1 ); R., p.29.

By the terms of this plea agreement,

Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to an offense that constitutes an aggravated felony, as a
crime of violence, under the pertinent immigration statutes.
A non-citizen who commits an aggravated felony is presumptively deportable.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An offense constitutes an aggravated felony if, inter
a/ia, the offense constitutes "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but

not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment is at least
one year." 8 U

.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(F).

In turn, a "crime of violence," for purposes of

immigration law, is defined as follows:
The term "crime of violence" means-

(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (emphasis added).
One of the elements of felony domestic violence, as charged in the State's
Amended Information in this case, was that Mr. lcanovic willfully and unlawful used
force or violence on the person of another. Given this, Mr. lcanovic's plea of guilty to
felony domestic violence in this case meets with the definition of a crime of violence,
and therefore constitutes an aggravated felony that rendered him eligible for
deportation.
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The immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea of guilty to felony domestic
violence were clear under federal law

this offense falls squarely within the statutory

definition of an aggravated felony as a crime of violence for which there is a
presumption of deportability.

ii.

Mr. lcanovic's Guilty Plea To Felony Domestic Violence In
This Case Constituted An Admission To A Crime Of
Domestic Violence

In addition, the immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea were clear, as
he was eligible for deportation under the plea as an admission to a crime of domestic
violence. Under federal law, a non-citizen is eligible for deportation if he or she commits
a crime of domestic violence.

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

A "crime of domestic

violence" for immigration purposes means a crime of violence that is directed against a
person who shares one certain enumerated relationships with the defendant, or who is
otherwise "protected from that individual's acts under the domestic or family violence
laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local
government." Id.
Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence, which inherently involves
the allegation of a crime of violence against a "household member." See I.C. §§ 18903, 18-918. This offense establishes certain classes of persons who are protected
from the charged individual's acts under the domestic violence statute.

Therefore,

Mr. lcanovic's plea to this offense falls clearly within the scope of a crime of domestic
violence under federal immigration law. By statute, the consequence of his conviction
was clear - as a crime of domestic violence under immigration law, it rendered him
eligible for deportation.
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b.

Because The Immigration Consequences For Mr. lcanovic's Plea
Were Clear Under The Federal Law, His Trial Counsel Had A Duty
To Advise Mr. lcanovic Of The Specific Consequences Of This
Plea, And It Constituted Deficient Performance When Counsel
Failed To Do So

Where the immigration consequences of a guilty plea are clear under federal law,
trial counsel has a duty to affirmatively inform a non-citizen defendant as to the specific
immigration consequences of that plea.

As has been noted, the immigration

consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea were clear - his plea rendered him eligible for
deportation - and further subject to a conclusive presumption of deportability.
Upon remand, the district court heard no additional testimony from Mr. Martens.
Thus, there is no dispute in this case that Mr. Martens did not advise Mr. lcanovic that
his plea rendered him eligible for deportation - and further subject to a conclusive
presumption of deportability, despite multiple conversations during which Mr. lcanovic
asked him about the immigration consequences of his plea. (Tr., p.14, L.12 - p.16, L.5,
p.20, Ls.11-13, p.21, L.8 - p.22, L.1.) Because Mr. lcanovic was entitled to be informed
by counsel of the specific immigration consequences of his guilty plea to felony
domestic violence, and because there is no dispute in this case that his counsel did not
provide this information, Mr. lcanovic's trial counsel tendered deficient performance.
The district court's focus on the possible consequences (that deportation was
possible but not certain) is in error.

The State has already conceded that advice of

"potential" consequences is inadequate.

(Motion for Remand, p.2.)

Of course

Mr. Martens could not have told Mr. lcanovic whether the federal government would
actually decide to begin deportation proceedings - he is not a federal immigration
officer. The correct legal advice was that Mr. lcanovic was presumptively deportable;
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the State acknowledges that, "deportation was
Remand, p.2.) There is no evidence in the record

mandatory."

(Motion for

Mr. lcanovic was informed that

he was presumptively deportable or that deportation was mandatory. Advice that he
"could" face deportation is not adequate.

The district court erred by holding that

Mr. Martens' advice, and the court's warnings, were accurate statements of the
immigration consequences.

3.

Mr. lcanovic Was Prejudiced As A Result Of Trial Counsel's Deficient
Performance

Mr. lcanovic also demonstrated prejudice from his trial counsel's failure to advise
him regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea to felony domestic
violence. As has been noted, the test for prejudice in such a case is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, had the defendant received adequate advice, he would not
have pleaded guilty to the charged offense. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676.
The potential immigration consequences for a guilty plea cannot be overstated.
In fact, the Padilla Court noted the severity of deportation as an immigration
consequence in noting that it is the modern equivalent of banishment or exile. Padilla,
559 U.S. at 373-74. Under the modern landscape of immigration law, the Padilla Court
further noted that deportation is often the most important aspect of the penalties that
may be imposed on non-citizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. Id. at
364.
In determining that Mr. lcanovic had failed to establish prejudice, the district court
first noted that that Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to a lesser charge than that with which
he was initially charged, and stated that, in light of the admissions Mr. lcanovic made at
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the entry of plea hearing, a conviction would be a "near certainty."
evidentiary hearing, p.31.)

(Order re:

lcanovic notes that the remedy he is seeking is

withdrawal of his plea. If he were to go to trial, it would be after his plea is withdrawn.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 410 applies and is specific:
(a) Inadmissibility. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of
the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible
against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the
plea discussions:
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
[... ]
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule
11 of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable Federal
or state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas.
IRE 41 0(a). Thus, Mr. lcanovic's plea and the statements made during the plea hearing
are not admissible in any future trial. 4 Further, Mr. lcanovic was asserting that, due to
the ineffective assistance of counsel, his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.

Admissions made by a defendant that are not knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary are not admissible. See, e.g., State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910 (Ct. App. 2012).
Then, the district court stated, "it is not even necessary to rely on such evidence"
because the evidence of Mr. lcanovic's guilt was overwhelming. (Order re: evidentiary
hearing, p.31.) The court summarized this "evidence" as follows:
This was not a "he said, she said" case of domestic violence. Not only did
the victim describe the basic facts of the crime to the police and provide a
written statement, but an uninvolved third-party witness, Ms. Lynn Majors,

The Rule provides for exceptions where another statement made in the course of
discussions has already been introduced and the statement should be in fairness
contemporaneously with it, where the trial is for perjury or false statement if the
statement was made under oath and with presence of counsel, or for impeachment.
IRE 410(b). None of these exceptions apply at this time.

4
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told officers she had witnessed Mr. lcanovic hit the victim (Sanela
Medmedovic) on the face and neck, that she yelled at Mr. lcanovic to stop,
and that she called the police, at which point Mr. lcanovic left the scene.
There was also bruising and swelling on the victim's neck observed by the
police thus, physical evidence existed to confirm the attack and, in
addition, the petitioner himself admitted to the attack.
(Order re: evidentiary hearing, pp.31-32.) This "evidence," as acknowledged by the
district court, comes from the State's brief in the district court, which the court
determined, "to be accurate statements as to the pertinent facts cited."

(Order re:

evidentiary hearing, p.32 n.5.)5 However, statements made by parties in a brief are not
evidence.

The State has acknowledged this before in a case involving a motion to

suppress where the district court relied upon the representation in a brief as opposed to
evidence offered at the suppression hearing:
Babb challenges the district court's findings because the court relied on
facts asserted in the State's supplemental briefing that were unsupported
by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. On appeal, the
State concedes that the district court improperly adopted the State's
assertions as factual findings without an evidentiary basis.
State v. Babb, 136 Idaho 95, 97 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

Idaho courts often state that the

findings of fact of the trier of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by
substantial and competent evidence.

See, e.g., State v. Tierny, 109 Idaho 474, 476

(1985). The rationale for this rule is that it "reflects the view that deference must be
accorded to the trial judge's special opportunity to assess and weigh the credibility of
the witnesses who appear." Id. However, where, as in the present case, the trier of fact

Some of the facts relied upon by the district court, such as the witness's name, are not
contained in the State's briefing. While it is unknown where these facts may come from,
they certainly do not come from the evidentiary hearing and thus cannot be relied upon
by the court.
5
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never seen a witness testify about the alleged facts or even seen an affidavit from
that witness, the trier of fact cannot reasonably determine credibility.
It is undisputed that Mr. lcanovic was very concerned about the potential
immigration consequences of his plea prior to pleading guilty.

He averred within his

petition for post-conviction relief that, but for counsel's inadequate advice regarding the
immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have pleaded guilty to felony
domestic violence.

(R., p.8.)

He submitted an affidavit into evidence at the second

evidentiary hearing that also averred that he would not have pleaded guilty but for
counsel's advice.

(Defendant's Exhibit A.)

It is also undisputed that Mr. lcanovic

repeatedly asked his trial attorney for counsel and advice as to the immigration
consequences of his plea. (Tr., p.14, 1.12 - p.1

L.5.) Under the record in this case, it

is clear that the immigration consequences of his plea were of central importance to
Mr. lcanovic in weighing whether to plead guilty in this case. These allegations are not
rebutted by any evidence in the record.

In light of this, Mr. lcanovic demonstrated a

reasonable probability that, but for the absence of affirmative, correct advice as to the
consequences of his guilty plea, he would not have pleaded guilty to felony domestic
violence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. lcanovic respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 21 st day of May, 2014.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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